Abstract: we design, for a broad class of rational-expectations dynamic stochastic generalequilibrium models, "bubble-free"interest-rate rules that not only ensure the local determinacy of the targeted equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state, but also prevent the economy from gradually leaving this neighbourhood. We show that these rules can still be e¤ect-ive when the perfect-information, rational-expectations and forever-commitment assumptions are slightly relaxed. The design and study of these rules also lead us to both generalize and qualify existing results on whether and to what extent an interest-rate rule should be forward-looking to ensure equilibrium determinacy.
Introduction
Today's most common practice to design monetary policy in a rational-expectations dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model proceeds in two steps. First, the exogenous stochastic disturbances are assumed to be small enough for the targeted equilibrium to be found in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. Second, an interest-rate rule is chosen such that the system of equations linearised in this neighbourhood admits that equilibrium as its unique stationary solution. Such an interest-rate rule, whose locally linearised form is often a Taylor rule satisfying the Taylor principle, enables the central bank to preclude the kind of macroeconomic ‡uctuations that, according to Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , occurred in the U.S. before 1979. However, as …rst shown by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a) , these interest-rate rules can be consistent with equilibrium trajectories that originate from the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state and gradually leave this neighbourhood for instance to fall eventually into the neighbourhood of another steady state interpreted as the liquidity trap, as arguably did the Japanese economy in the 1990s-2000s. This paper is a revised version of Loisel (2006) . I am grateful in particular to Klaus Adam, Lawrence Christiano, Daniel Cohen, Harris Dellas, Jordi Galí, Marc Giannoni, Michel Juillard, Hubert Kempf, Guy Laroque, Philippe Martin and Pedro Teles for their comments at various stages of this long project. The usual disclaimer applies. This paper designs locally linearised interest-rate rules that preclude all the undesirable developments mentioned above by not only ensuring the local determinacy of the targeted equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state, but also preventing the economy from gradually leaving this neighbourhood. To that aim, we consider a broad class of rational-expectations dynamic stochastic linear systems of equations, meant to represent the locally linearised reduced form of rational-expectations DSGE models. Provided that the exogenous stochastic disturbances are small enough, a necessary condition for the economy to gradually leave the neighbourhood of a steady state is that the locally linearised system admit at least one unstable eigenvalue, i.e. one eigenvalue of modulus higher than or equal to one. By removing all unstable eigenvalues from the locally linearised system, the interest-rate rules put forward in this paper therefore prevent the economy from gradually leaving the neighbourhood of the steady state considered. They moreover manage to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a local equilibrium by removing all non-predetermined variables from the locally linearised system, thus making this system satisfy Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) conditions. We call them "bubble-free interest-rate rules" because, in the …ctitious linear model corresponding to this locally linearised system, they would eliminate all mean-divergent rational bubbles of the type …rst identi…ed by Blanchard (1979) , unlike the interest-rate rules commonly considered in the literature.
Loosely speaking, bubble-free interest-rate rules manage to remove all non-predetermined variables from the locally linearised system by mimicking the locally linearised structural equations, i.e. the locally linearised system without the interest-rate rule, so as to disconnect current variables other than the current interest rate from the private agents'expectations of future variables.
We point out that, as a consequence, under a certain condition (likely to be met by most DSGE models of the broad class considered), these interest-rate rules are forward-looking, i.e. make the current interest rate conditional on the private agents'current expectations of future variables. We moreover show that, for any given stationary solution of the locally linearised structural equations, there also exists a backward-looking interest-rate rule consistent with this solution, ensuring its local determinacy and preventing the economy from gradually leaving the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. These two …ndings enable us to both generalize and qualify existing results on whether an interest-rate rule should be backward-or forward-looking to ensure equilibrium determinacy. The consideration of bubble-free interest-rate rules also enables us to contribute to the literature on how much forward-looking a forward-looking interest-rate rule should be in order to ensure equilibrium determinacy.
Since, loosely speaking, bubble-free interest-rate rules mimic the locally linearised structural equations, some of their coe¢ cients are tied to the structural parameters by equality constraints, rather than by inequality constraints as is typically the case for the coe¢ cients of interest-rate rules ensuring only local equilibrium determinacy. This naturally raises the issue of what happens when the central bank has imperfect knowledge of the structural parameters and accordingly follows an interest-rate rule close to, but not exactly coinciding with a bubble-free interest-rate rule. We show that such a rule still ensures local equilibrium determinacy and, by using the structural equations as a lever on private agents' expectations, still prevents the economy from gradually leaving the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. We also show that bubble-free interest-rate rules can still be e¤ective when the private agents form myopic rational expectations and when the central bank cannot credibly commit to forever following an interest-rate rule, while by contrast conventional interest-rate rules then prove even more problematic.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our general framework.
Section 2 designs bubble-free interest-rate rules. Section 3 uses both the results and the methods of section 2 to examine whether and to what extent an interest-rate rule should be forward-looking to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the results of section 2 to departures from various assumptions. We then conclude and provide a technical appendix.
A general locally linearisable model
This section presents our general framework.
Locally linearised system
We consider a rational-expectations DSGE model with one policy-maker and many private agents, whether in…nitely-lived or in overlapping generations. This model has N + 1 endogenous scalar variables, where N 2 N 1 . Only one of them, called the control variable or policy instrument, is directly controlled by the policy-maker. We make this restriction because we will consider only monetary policy applications in the paper and most central banks use the short-term nominal interest rate as their single monetary policy instrument. But this restriction is without any loss in generality since, in the case of several control variables, the policy-maker could always exogenize all but one.
The model admits at least one steady state. If there are several steady states, then we call "targeted steady state" the one that is preferred by the policy-maker, e.g. the social-welfaremaximizing steady state. If there is only one, then for simplicity we call it "targeted steady state" too. The model is linearisable in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. The reduced form of the model, linearised in this neighbourhood, is made of N + 1 time-invariant linear equations that can be further decomposed into N structural equations, which describe the private agents' behaviour, and one policy feedback rule. Time being discrete, indexed by t 2 Z, let z t denote the deviation of the control variable at date t from its value at the targeted steady state, Y t the N -dimension vector made of the deviations of the non-control variables at date t from their values at the targeted steady state, L the lag operator, t a N -dimension vector of exogenous shocks and E t f:g the rational-expectations operator conditionally on fY t k ; z t k g k 1 and t k k 0 .
The N structural equations are written as follows 2 :
where m a ; m b ; n a ; n b ; n c 2 N 5 , all A k , B k and C k have real numbers as elements and all the eigenvalues of C (L) are of modulus strictly lower than one. Each exogenous shock is assumed to follow a centered stationary autoregressive process of …nite order 3 :
and
invertible, all the eigenvalues of D (L) are of modulus strictly lower than one and " t is a Ndimension white noise vector that has a bounded probability distribution.
Let us call "fundamental shocks" the exogenous stochastic disturbances that feature in the model's equilibrium conditions and "sunspot shock" any exogenous stochastic process that is independent from all fundamental shocks. We de…ne an equilibrium of the model as a sequence for the endogenous variables, conditional on current and past fundamental and/or sunspot shocks, that satis…es all the model's equilibrium conditions. Importantly, we assume that (1) is a valid …rst-order approximation of the structural equations at date t provided that, at the equilibrium considered, all Y t k and z t k for k 2 1; :::; max n a ; n Finally, we consider the set of policy feedback rules whose locally linearised form can be written as follows:
2 The focus of the paper, namely the design and the study of policy feedback rules in a general framework, forbids us to start from the commonly used expression with only one lag and one lead for the locally linearised system. 3 This assumption is not restrictive in the sense that if each element of t followed instead a centered stationary …nite-order ARMA process, then C (L) t could easily be rewritten in the form C (L) t with C (L) P n c k=0 C k L k , where n c 2 N, all C k are N N matrices with real numbers as elements, all the eigenvalues of C (L) are of modulus strictly lower than one and each element of t follows a centered stationary autoregressive process of …nite order.
with F (L)
where m f ; n f ; n g ; n h 2 N 4 , all g k are real numbers, g 0 6 = 0 and all F k , H k have real numbers as elements. Such rules qualify as "instrument rules" since their z t -coe¢ cient g 0 is non-zero. We assume throughout the paper, except in subsection 4.3, that the policy-maker can credibly commit to forever following a policy feedback rule whose locally linearised form is of type (2).
Three additional assumptions
This subsection presents three additional assumptions that we make about the N structural equations (1). To that aim, let e i denote, for all i 2 f1; :::; N g, the N -element vector whose i th element is equal to one and whose other elements are equal to zero. Let I A denote the set of i 2 f1; :::; N g such that e Moreover, let i (X) 2 R [X] for i 2 f1; :::; N + 1g denote the determinant of the N N matrix obtained by removing its i th column from
and let D (X) 2 R [X] denote the greatest common divisor, de…ned up to a non-zero multiplicative scalar, of all non-zero i (X) for i 2 f1; :::; N + 1g. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3: all roots of D (X) have their modulus strictly lower than one.
To our knowledge, rational-expectations DSGE models whose locally linearised structural equations are of type (1) typically satisfy assumptions 1 and 3. We view assumption 2 as slightly more restrictive. However, the speci…cation made of (1) together with assumptions 1, 2 and 3 is general enough to encompass the suitably rewritten locally linearised structural equations of many rational-expectations DSGE models, and in particular of all those models whose locally linearised 4 All the propositions of the paper would still hold if assumption 2.iii were replaced by 8i 2 I B r f1g, m a structural equations are written in a form of type (1) satisfying assumption 1 and 3 and featuring the short-term nominal interest rate only as a current variable (i.e. such that m b = n b = 0), for instance in the Euler equation, the Tobin's Q equation or the uncovered interest-rate parity.
Indeed, the locally linearised structural equations of these models can easily be rewritten in an equivalent form of type (1) satisfying assumptions 1, 2 and 3, by re-ordering these equations so that 1 2 I B and 8i 2 I B r f1g, m 
Targeted and non-targeted equilibria
In most rational-expectations DSGE models, the targeted equilibrium (e.g. the globally-socialwelfare-maximizing equilibrium) does not depend on sunspot shocks, and the fundamental shocks are assumed to be small enough for this equilibrium to be found in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. As a consequence, the targeted equilibrium can typically be locally linearised in a stationary VARMA form that does not involve white noises other than those featuring in the structural equations. We accordingly assume that the policy-maker seeks to implement a given sequence fY t ; z t g t2Z that satis…es (1) for t 2 Z and can be written in the form (1) is deemed an acceptable approximation of the model's structural equations, and n a given open neighbourhood of the targeted steady state such that: i) n N; ii) whatever the realization of the exogenous shocks, the endogenous variables constantly remain in n at the targeted equilibrium. The global interest-rate rule chosen should ideally not only be consistent with the targeted local equilibrium presented above, but also eliminate all other equilibria. In this paper, we focus on the following two kinds of non-targeted equilibrium:
De…nition 1 (type-A equilibria): an equilibrium of the model is said to be of type A if: i) whatever the realization of the exogenous shocks, the endogenous variables constantly remain in N at this equilibrium; and ii) this equilibrium di¤ ers from the targeted equilibrium.
Type-A equilibria correspond to the non-targeted local equilibria. As is well-known, they may exist only if the locally linearised system admits more stable eigenvalues (i.e. eigenvalues of modulus strictly lower than one) than required by Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) conditions. De…nition 2 (type-B equilibria): an equilibrium of the model is said to be of type B if there exists t 2 Z such that, at this equilibrium: i) whatever the realization of the exogenous shocks, the endogenous variables remain in n up to date t 1; ii) the endogenous variables are in N n n at date t; iii) whatever the realization of the exogenous shocks, the endogenous variables are in N from date t to date t+ ; and iv) the endogenous variables are outside N at some date later than t+ .
Type-B equilibria correspond to the equilibria that originate from the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state and gradually leave this neighbourhood. The possibility of their existence has been shown, among others, by Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) , Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a , 2001b , 2002a , 2002b and Christiano and Rostagno (2001) . In these frameworks, type-B equilibria take the form of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to the targeted steady state and gradually leaving its neighbourhood to eventually converge towards a deterministic cycle, a chaotic cycle or a non-targeted steady state interpreted as the liquidity trap.
In Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (2001a) framework, notably, they exist for empirically plausible parameterizations and are robust to wide parameter perturbations.
Importantly, provided that the exogenous shocks are small enough, a necessary condition for type-B equilibria to exist is that the locally linearised system admit at least one unstable eigenvalue, i.e. one eigenvalue of modulus higher than or equal to one (otherwise all equilibria originating locally would remain local). Note, interestingly, that Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a , 2002a , 2002b provide one reason to suspect that type-B equilibria exist in many frameworks satisfying this condition. Indeed, they point out that when the interest-rate rule respects the zero nominal interest-rate lower bound and makes the interest rate react positively and, at the targeted steady state, more than one-to-one to the in ‡ation rate, there typically exist equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to the targeted steady state and gradually leaving its neighbourhood to eventually converge towards a second steady state at which the in ‡ation rate is lower than its targeted value and the interest rate reacts less than one-to-one to the in ‡ation rate.
Naturally, type-B equilibria do not constitute the only possible kind of non-local equilibria.
In particular, equibria may exist that abruptly leave the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state, as opposed to gradually, or that may not even originate from this neighbourhood. However, these other equilibria seem to us less relevant than type-B equilibria, for essentially the same reason as the one put forward by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a, p. (2) that not only are consistent with the targeted local equilibrium and eliminate type-A equilibria, but also eliminate type-B equilibria as well. We call them "bubble-free interest-rate rules" because, in the …ctitious linear model corresponding to our locally linearised system, they would eliminate all mean-divergent rational bubbles of the type …rst identi…ed by Blanchard (1979) , unlike the interest-rate rules commonly considered in the literature.
Bubble-free policy feedback rules
Let us adopt the convention P v i=u f:g = 0 for u > v. Consider the policy feedback rules of the following form:
where
and R (L) satisfy the following conditions:
, where all O i;k have real numbers as elements.
Condition 2: P (L)
where n p 2 N and all P k have real numbers as elements, and
where n q 2 N and all q k are real numbers.
has all its eigenvalues of modulus strictly lower than one.
where n r 2 N and all R k have real numbers as elements.
Rules of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 belong to the class of rules (2), in particular because
is non-zero. Two features of these rules, which may seem unpleasant at …rst sight, are worth acknowledging at this stage: …rst, their use requires perfect knowledge of the structural parameters, since some of their coe¢ cients are linked to these parameters by equality constraints; second, they rapidly become more and more complex as the number of forward-looking structural equations increases. These two points are addressed in subsections 4.1 and 4.2 of the paper.
For any system of equations (S), let L(S) denote the system obtained by applying operator L on both the left-and the right-hand sides of each equation of (S). We …rst show that the …ctitious linear model corresponding to our locally linearised system made of (1) and any rule of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 admits a unique solution and that this solution is non-explosive:
for all k admits a unique solution fY t j ; z t j g j2N and this solution is stationary.
Proof : cf appendix A.
As made clear in appendix A, rules of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 achieve the existence and uniqueness of the solution fY t ; z t g by insulating Y t from E t fY t+k g and E t fz t+k g for k 1, thus pinning down Y t uniquely, and by making z t uniquely recoverable from Y t . Since the structural equations may express Y t as a function of E t fY t+k g and E t fz t+k g for k 1, these rules are designed to "mimic" the structural equations in such a way that, when combined with these structural equations, they disconnect Y t from E t fY t+k g and E t fz t+k g for k 1. More precisely, the expectation at date t of one of these rules taken at date t + m b 1 has the same forward-looking part as the …rst structural equation, so that subtracting one from the other leads to a backwardlooking equation; similarly, the expectation at date t of this backward-looking equation taken at date t + m a 2 has the same forward-looking part as the second structural equation, and so on. This explains why the time needed by these rules to be e¤ective, equal to periods, is a function of the length of the forward-looking part of the structural equations. Since the system made of
and L k (4) for all k would be a valid …rst-order approximation of the model's equilibrium conditions along a candidate type-B equilibrium trajectory, proposition 1 implies that rules of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 not only ensure local equilibrium determinacy, but also eliminate all type-B equilibria.
We then show that whatever targeted local equilibrium of type (3) satisfying (1) can be implemented by a suitably chosen policy feedback rule of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5:
Proposition 2 (controllability): for any sequence fY t ; z t g t2Z of type (3) that satis…es (1) for
and R (L) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 and such that fY t ; z t g t2Z is the unique solution of the system made of (1) and (4) for all t 2 Z.
Proof : cf appendix B.
Technically speaking, after choosing O (L) satisfying condition 1, appendix B uses the generalized identity of Bezout and the Euclidian division to choose some P (L) and Q (L) that satisfy conditions 2, 3 and 4 and are such that the eigenvalues of I S (L) are also eigenvalues of the system made of (1) and (4), and Cramer's rule to residually choose an R (L) that satis…es condition 5 and is such that the unique solution of this system coincides with the targeted stationary VARMA process (3). Hence, propositions 1 and 2 together imply that rules of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 not only are consistent with the targeted local equilibrium, but also eliminate all type-A and -B equilibria.
A New Keynesian illustration
Our assumption that the linearization of the model's equilibrium conditions in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state is valid even when endogenous variables are expected to leave this neighbourhood at some su¢ ciently distant point in the future forbids us to consider models with a Calvo-type price-setting mechanism, such as the New Keynesian model 5 . Nevertheless, we feel that the best way to illustrate propositions 1 and 2 is to consider this well-known model and proceed as if it satis…ed this assumption.
Let us therefore consider the New Keynesian model, for simplicity in its deterministic version, and assume that the targeted steady state is the globally social-welfare-maximizing steady state.
The structural equations linearised in the neighbourhood of this steady state are then of type (1) = 0, and satisfy assumptions 1, 2 and 3. They consist of an IS equation and a Phillips curve whose reduced forms are respectively written:
where x t , t and i t respectively denote the deviations at date t of the output gap, the in ‡ation rate and the short-term nominal interest rate from their values at the targeted steady state, while , and are three parameters such that 0 < < 1, > 0 and > 0. The targeted equilibrium, assumed to be the globally social-welfare-maximizing equilibrium, here coincides with the targeted steady state, i.e. corresponds to t = x t = i t = 0 for t 2 Z.
Suppose for a moment that the central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate according to a contemporaneous Taylor rule
with ( ; x ) 2 R 2 . The locally linearised system is then made of (6), (7) and (8). As can be easily seen by putting it into Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form, this system has two non-predetermined variables and two eigenvalues whatever the value taken by ( ; x ) 2 R 2 . As a consequence, if
( ; x ) is chosen so that these two eigenvalues are unstable, then Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) conditions are satis…ed, i.e. type-A equilibria are eliminated, but type-B equilibria may exist 6 .
Alternatively, if ( ; x ) is chosen so that these two eigenvalues are stable, then the economy jumps out of the frying pan into the …re as type-B equilibria can no longer exist but type-A equilibria do. In other words, contemporaneous Taylor rules do not enable the central bank to have the cake and eat it. This result naturally holds for any interest-rate rule that is not designed to control the number of non-predetermined variables of the locally linearised system and explains why Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a , 2002a , 2002b …nd that type-B equilibria exist precisely when type-A equilibria are eliminated by a locally "active" interest-rate rule.
By contrast, bubble-free interest-rate rules manage to eliminate both type-A and -B equilibria by removing all non-predetermined variables and all unstable eigenvalues from the locally linearised system. Such is the case, for instance, of the following kind of interest-rate rules:
where denotes the …rst-di¤erence operator and 2 R , that is to say that, as an illustration of proposition 1, the system made of (6), (7) and (9) taken at dates t to t + 2 pins down ( t ; x t ; i t )
uniquely. Indeed, the replacement of i t in (6) by the right-hand side of (9) leads to t = 0, as the terms in E t f t+1 g, E t fx t+1 g and x t cancel each other out; the same reasoning conducted one period ahead implies E t f t+1 g = 0; the replacement of E t f t+1 g and t in (7) by 0 then leads to x t = 0; the same reasoning conducted one period ahead implies E t fx t+1 g = 0; …nally, (6) or (9) then leads to i t = 0 7 .
It is worth noting that, by making i t react to E t f t+1 g with a coe¢ cient unity and to t with an arbitrary non-zero coe¢ cient, rules (9) do not necessarily satisfy the so-called Taylor principle, which makes i t react strictly more than one-to-one to the current or the expected future in ‡ation rate. This result is due to the fact that, in the standard New Keynesian model considered, the Taylor principle is a necessary condition to eliminate type-A equilibria for speci…c parametric families of interest-rate rules, for instance rules of type i t = t or i t = E t f t+1 g that make the locally linearised system have two non-predetermined variables whatever 2 R; but it ceases to be one for slightly more general parametric families of interest-rate rules, as shown e.g. by Woodford (2003, chap. 4) , even though these rules do not a¤ect the number of non-predetermined variables of the locally linearised system; and it is de…nitely not one for parametric families of interest-rate rules general enough to include rules (9) that remove all non-predetermined variables from the locally linearised system.
Related literature
This subsection brie ‡y reviews the literature on how monetary policy can eliminate type-B equilibria and positions our paper within this literature.
The literature has mostly proposed two-tier monetary policies to eliminate type-B equilibria, in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogo¤'s (1983) fractional-backing proposal to rule out speculative hyperin ‡ations. These two-tier monetary policies, advocated most notably by Benhabib, SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2002a , 2002b , Christiano and Rostagno (2001) and Woodford (2003, chap. 2), consist in switching from an interest-rate rule eliminating type-A equilibria to another rule such as a money growth rate peg (possibly accompanied by a non-Ricardian …scal policy) when the endogenous variables go outside a speci…ed neighbourhood of the targeted steady state. However, as argued by Green (2005) and Cochrane (2006) , one drawback of these two-tier policies is that their credibility, and consequently their e¤ectiveness in eliminating type-B equilibria, cannot be taken for granted, in particular because they are typically aggressive out of equilibrium when the endogenous variables go o¤ track. Given that they are immune from this drawback, since they act while the endogenous variables are still in the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state, bubble-free interest-rate rules represent a particularly interesting alternative or complement to these two-tier policies.
To our knowledge, only four papers make other monetary policy proposals enabling the central bank to eliminate type-B equilibria. First, Currie and Levine (1993, chap. 4 ) design "overstable feedback rules" that remove all unstable eigenvalues from linear systems without a¤ecting the exist if, for instance, a term Et fx t+1 g were arti…cially added to the right-hand side of (7), leaving (6) unchanged, provided that 6 = so as to satisfy assumption 1.iii. 3 Forward-and backward-looking interest-rate rules
This section uses both the results and the methods of the previous section to shed some new light on the answers to the following two questions: should the interest-rate rule be forward-or backward-looking in order to ensure equilibrium determinacy? And how much forward-looking should a forward-looking interest-rate rule be in order to ensure equilibrium determinacy?
Forward-looking vs. backward-looking rules
This subsection deals more speci…cally with the question whether the interest-rate rule should be forward-or backward-looking to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Let us …rst de…ne the concepts of forward-looking and backward-looking rules:
De…nition 3 (forward-and backward-looking rules): a policy feedback rule of type (2) is typically met by rationalexpectations DSGE models encompassed within our general speci…cation, in particular because their structural equations typically include an Euler equation. 8 The two works were conducted independently from each other. The …rst versions of the present paper go back to Loisel (2003 Loisel ( , 2004 (2) that is backward-looking and such that the system made of (1) and this rule: i) admits fY t ; z t g t2Z as its unique stationary solution; ii) has at most non-predetermined variables; and iii) has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and .
Proof : cf appendix C.
Technically speaking, appendix C largely draws on appendix B as it uses the generalized identity of Bezout and the Euclidian division to choose F (L) with m f = 0 and G (L) such that: i) the system made of (1) and (2) admits one unique stationary solution and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and , and ii) the eigenvalues of I S (L) are also eigenvalues of this system; and Cramer's rule to residually choose H (L) such that the unique local solution of this system coincides with the targeted stationary VARMA process (3).
For any 2 R + n [0; 1], let us note (R ) the rule whose existence is stated in proposition 3. Let us consider a given 2 R + n [0; 1]. Since the system made of (1) and (R ) admits the targeted equilibrium as its unique stationary solution and has at most non-predetermined variables, and since n includes all the possible realizations of the endogenous variables at the targeted equilibrium, any candidate type-B equilibrium needs to involve, in its locally linearised analytical expression, at least one unstable eigenvalue of the system in order to leave n while remaining in N for at least more periods. However, for large enough, all the unstable eigenvalues of the system have too large a modulus for any candidate type-B equilibrium to remain in N for at least periods after leaving n. Therefore, provided that is large enough, (R ) eliminates all type-B equilibria. As a consequence, proposition 3 implies that there exists a backward-looking interest-rate rule that is consistent with the targeted equilibrium and eliminates both type-A and -B equilibria. the system made of (1) and this rule admits a unique stationary solution and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and .
Proof : cf appendix D.
In this proposition, n and M represent how much "long-tailed" and aggressive respectively the policy-maker is prepared to choose her rule. She may want to restrict her choice in such a way because, if chosen beyond these limits, the rule would be too complex or, by magnifying her data- 
Related literature
This subsection brie ‡y reviews two closely related strands of the literature and positions our paper within each of these strands.
The …rst strand of the literature deals with the issue of whether the interest-rate rule should be forward-or backward-looking in order to eliminate type-A equilibria. This strand of the literature has usually come in favour of the use of a backward-looking rule. For instance, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) show that some commonly considered forward-looking rules lead to type-A equilibria in the New Keynesian model and therefore warn against following forward-looking rules without …rst developing a structural model of the economy. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000 , 2005 similarly show that some commonly considered forward-looking rules lead to type-A equilibria in various models, contrary to some commonly considered backward-looking rules, and therefore advocate the use of backward-looking rules. However, this strand of the literature usually restricts its analysis to speci…c models and, in particular, to speci…c low-dimensional parametric families of rules (typically Taylor-type rules). We thus generalize the results obtained by this strand of the literature by showing that not only type-A equilibria, but also type-B equilibria can be eliminated by a backward-looking rule in all models of the broad class considered and by a forward-looking rule in most of these models.
The second strand of the literature focuses on the issue of how much forward-looking a forwardlooking interest-rate rule should be in order to eliminate type-A equilibria. Batini and Pearlman (2002) , Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2004) , Batini, Justiniano, Levine and Pearlman (2006) and Leitemo (2006) consider interest-rate rules of type i t = + i t 1 + E t f t+ g with ( ; ; ) 2 R 3 and 2 N, where i t and t respectively denote the short-term nominal interest rate and the in‡ation rate at date t, and …nd that the more forward-looking the interest-rate rule or equivalently the more distant the forecast horizon (i.e. the higher ), the higher the risks of type-A equilibria or macroeconomic instability the latter arising when the locally linearised system admits more unstable eigenvalues than required by Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) conditions 9 . Worryingly enough, these risks often materialise for the one-to two-year forecast horizons typically adopted by in ‡ation-targeting central banks. Similarly, Giannoni and Woodford (2003) show, in some simple models, that interest-rate rules that eliminate type-A equilibria, are consistent with the targeted equilibrium and are independent of the statistical properties of the exogenous shocks can be found that are only modestly (if at all) forward-looking, that is to say that the forward-looking part of these rules mainly features current expectations of only one-or two-quarter ahead endogenous variables. They point out that this result provides little support for monetary policies that make the current short-term nominal interest rate respond primarily to one-to two-year-ahead in ‡ation forecasts, such as those of in ‡ation-targeting central banks. Interestingly, our requirement that interest-rate rules should eliminate both type-A and -B equilibria and be consistent with the targeted equilibrium leads to a similar result (though for a di¤erent reason) in those of their models that are encompassed within our speci…cation, namely the result that the forward-looking part of interest-rate rules can be limited to only one-quarter-ahead forecasts.
Robustness of bubble-free interest-rate rules
This section discusses the robustness of the e¤ectiveness of bubble-free interest-rate rules to departures from three assumptions in turn: i) that the policy-maker has perfect knowledge of the structural parameters; ii) that the private agents form rational expectations; iii) that the policymaker can credibly commit to locally following a given interest-rate rule.
9 Levin, Wieland and Williams (2003) obtain a similar result while considering a slightly more general family of interest-rate rules. Technically speaking, this result can be interpreted as follows: the choice of a more forward-looking interest-rate rule (i.e. of a higher ) is most likely to increase the number of eigenvalues and nonpredetermined variables of the locally linearised system and hence the risk that no ( ; ) exists such that Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) condition is satis…ed. By contrast, the Calvo-type interest-rate rules put forward by Levine, McAdam and Pearlman (2007) , of the kind it = + i t 1 + Et n P +1 k=0 ' k t+k o with ( ; ; ) 2 R 3 and ' 2 ]0; 1[, manage to be in…nitely forward-looking while making the locally linearised system have a …nite (and possibly even small) number of eigenvalues and non-predetermined variables, which might well explain why these rules are much more successful in eliminating type-A equilibria.
Policy-maker' s imperfect knowledge
This subsection examines the sensitivity of propositions 1 and 2 to the assumption that the policymaker has perfect knowledge of the structural parameters, i.e. the coe¢ cients featuring in the structural equations (1). This robustness analysis is particularly welcome as some of the coe¢ cients of rules (4) are tightly tied to the structural parameters by equality constraints. By contrast, all the coe¢ cients of interest-rate rules ensuring only local equilibrium determinacy are more loosely tied to the structural parameters by inequality constraints, as exempli…ed by the well-known Taylor principle or by Rotemberg and Woodford's (1999) "superinertia principle"(generalized by Woodford, 2002, and Woodford, 2003, chap. 8 ).
Let us …rst de…ne the metric d by
; X 2 (L)
where (m x ; n x ) 2 N 2 , (N 1 ; N 2 ) 2 N 2 , all X 1;k , X 2;k have real numbers as elements and, for h 2 f1; 2g and l 2 f1; :::; N h g, e h;l is the N h -element vector whose l th element is equal to one and whose other elements are equal to zero. Let us then consider a rule of type (4) satisfying conditions 1 to 5, noted (R), which is consistent with the targeted local equilibrium of type (3) satisfying (1).
Let us also rewrite this targeted equilibrium as
where all X k have real numbers as elements. Lastly, let ( e R) denote the rule corresponding to the expression (4) of rule (R) where some exogenous measurement errors, each of them randomly drawn from a continuous probability distribution supported on a bounded interval including zero 10 , are added to the elements of
to d i;k for 1 i N and 0 k n d , and let " denote the maximal length of the distributionsupporting intervals. We get the following proposition:
Proposition 5: (i) 9 2 R + n [0; 1] such that, …rst, for " close enough to 0, with probability one, the system made of (1) and ( e R) admits a unique stationary solution and has at most non-predetermined variables and no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and and, second,
where all e X k have real numbers as elements, the unique stationary solution (with probability one) of the system made of (1) and ( e R) for " close enough to 0, we have:
Proof : cf appendix E.
In other words, if the policy-maker's knowledge of the structural parameters is su¢ ciently accurate, then ( e R) ensures local equilibrium determinacy with probability one. Moreover, as the policymaker's knowledge of the structural parameters becomes perfect, the unique local equilibrium trajectory (with probability one) gets arbitrarily close to the targeted path for the endogenous variables. Finally, if the policy-maker's knowledge of the structural parameters is su¢ ciently accurate, then ( e R) also eliminates type-B equilibria by using the structural equations as a lever on the private agents'expectations (as made clear in appendix E) to make all equilibrium trajectories leaving the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state do so too abruptly to qualify as type-B equilibria. In short and loosely speaking, both propositions 1 and 2 hold asymptotically with probability one. Therefore, the equality constraints tying some of the coe¢ cients of bubble-free rules to the structural parameters, thus making the policy-maker manoeuvre on a Wicksellian-type razor's edge, prove not as restrictive as they may seem at …rst sight.
Private agents'myopic rational expectations
One way to relax the rational-expectations assumption is to suppose instead that the private agents form myopic rational expectations, i.e. rational expectations up to a given …nite horizon h 2 N .
Interestingly, this alternative assumption may make the economy more bubble-prone 11 , that is to say in our context type-B equilibria more likely, under conventional interest-rate rules. By contrast, bubble-free interest-rate rules would remain e¤ective in eliminating both type-A and -B equilibria provided that h , as clear from proposition 1.
Policy-maker' s inability to commit
Instead of assuming that the policy-maker can credibly commit to forever following a policy feedback rule, suppose now more realistically that she can credibly commit only to following a policy feedback rule during at most d periods, where d 2 N . As clear from proposition 1, bubble-free interest-rate rules then remain e¤ective in eliminating both type-A and -B equilibria provided that d .
By contrast, under conventional interest-rate rules, not only type-B equilibria, but also interestingly a third kind of non-targeted equilibria may then exist, which we call type-C equilibria.
1 1 This point was …rst made by Tirole (1982) .
Indeed, suppose that the central banker credibly commits at a given date t to follow, during the next d periods, an interest-rate rule that makes the locally linearised system have at least one unstable eigenvalue. If the economy started to embark, during these d periods, on a path leaving the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state, then the stability-concerned central banker would change its interest-rate rule at some date after t+d in order to keep the variables within this neighbourhood or to bring them back into this neighbourhood, because she would …nd it both possible and desirable. Though initially diverging, the resulting boom-and-bust path remains bounded, and even local if the triggered interest-rate-rule adjustment occurs before the linear approximation of the structural equations becomes invalid. As a consequence, when the original non-linear model features in…nitely-lived utility-maximizing private agents, this path does not violate the transversality condition typically required and hence typically quali…es as an equilibrium of this model. This "stabilization of last resort" raises a moral hazard problem since private agents, rightly expecting this reaction from the central banker, can settle on an initially diverging path even in the case where this path would not be an equilibrium if the central banker were compelled to stick forever to its interest-rate rule. In other words, these type-C equilibria, which the existing literature has so far ignored, can exist even when type-B equilibria do not 12 .
Conclusion
This paper aims to give a new insight into the design of interest-rate rules in a broad class of rational-expectations DSGE models. The literature has so far mostly focused on particular kinds of interest-rate rules that preclude unintended ‡uctuations around the targeted steady state (type-A equilibria), e.g. Taylor rules satisfying the Taylor principle. However, as …rst acknowledged by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a), such rules do not prevent the economy from embarking on a path gradually leaving the neighbourhood of the targeted steady state and leading for instance to the liquidity trap (type-B equilibria). By contrast, the bubble-free interest-rate rules put forward in this paper manage to eliminate both types of equilibria, even when the perfectinformation, rational-expectations and forever-commitment assumptions are slightly relaxed.
Obviously, bubble-free interest-rate rules make sense only insofar as the behaviour of private agents is at least partly forward-looking, since equilibrium indeterminacy would not be an issue otherwise. But most, if not all rational-expectations DSGE models based on explicit microeconomic foundations imply such a forward-looking behaviour for the private agents 13 , which has led Woodford (2003, chap. 1) to view the essence of central banking as the management of expectations. However, this now conventional view does not go as far as arguing that central banks should react to private agents' expectations through a forward-looking interest-rate rule: for instance, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have famously warned against following forward-looking interestrate rules without …rst developing a structural model of the economy. In this paper, we thus carry this view further still by arguing for the use of forward-looking (bubble-free) interest-rate rules on the basis of a broad class of structural models of the economy.
For any system of equations (S), let E t f(S)g denote the system obtained by applying operator E t on both the left-and the right-hand sides of each equation of (S). For any polynomial H (X) 2 R [X], let d H denote the degree of H (X). Let j:j denote the determinant operator. Lastly, for any scalar , any non-zero integers n and p and any n p matrix K, let K denote the product of the n n matrix whose diagonal elements are all equal to and whose non-diagonal elements are all equal to 0 by matrix K, and let K denote the product of matrix K by the p p matrix whose diagonal elements are all equal to and whose non-diagonal elements are all equal to 0 (note that
A Proof of proposition 1
Consider a given t 2 Z and suppose that L k (1) and L k (4) hold for all k max m a 1 ; m
Similarly, 8k 2 f2; :::
and in particular
Equations ! N and k for k 2 f2; :::; N g together can be re-written as follows:
. . . (4) directly expresses z t as a function of Y t 1 k , z t 1 k and t k for k 0. In both cases, the system thus obtained, made of this equation for z t and (12) for Y t , is backward-looking and non-degenerate and hence uniquely determines Y t and z t as a function of Y t 1 k , z t 1 k and t k for k 0. This system, noted (S), and the systems L k (S) for all k 1 that can be similarly obtained, then uniquely determine Y t j and z t j for j 2 N as a function of t j k for k 0. Given that the system made of L k (S) for all k 0 is implied by the system made of L k (1) and L k (4) for all k , the latter admits either zero or one unique solution for fY t j ; z t j g j2N . Finally, given that the system made of L k (S) for all k 2 Z admits one unique solution for fY t k ; z t k g k2Z and, as can be readily checked (using notably assumption 2.ii), is equivalent to the system made of L k (1) and L k (4) for all k 2 Z, we conclude that the system made of L k (1) and L k (4) for all k admits one unique solution for fY t j ; z t j g j2N . This solution is stationary because the eigenvalues of the system made of L k (1) and L k (4) for all k 2 Z are those of (5) which, given condition 4, are stable.
B Proof of proposition 2
For the sake of expositional clarity, we omit the expression "for all t 2 Z"throughout this appendix.
We prove proposition 2 by showing that, for any (3) satisfying (1)
and R (L) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 and such that (3) implies (1) and (4) and therefore, following proposition 1, such that (3) is the unique solution of the system made of (1) and (4). To that aim, suppose that a given (3) holds that satis…es (1).
Step 1: then, (1) holds as well. Moreover, there exists O (L) satisfying condition 1 and such that 2 6 6 6 6 4
Step 2: the generalized identity of Bezout implies that there exists (U 1 (X) ; :::;
Let (X) 2 R [X] denote the polynomial, de…ned up to a non-zero multiplicative scalar, which has the same roots (whose modulus is strictly lower than one) with the same multiplicity as the eigenvalues of the system I S (L) corresponding to the autoregressive part of the targeted stationary VARMA process (3). Let Z (X) 2 R [X] be a given polynomial that: i) has all its roots of modulus strictly lower than one; and ii) is such that (X) is a divisor of Z (X) D (X). Given that assumption 1.iii implies the existence of I 2 f1; :::; N g such that 2 6 6 6 4
is invertible, let n 2 N be such that
be respectively the quotient and the remainder of the Euclidian division of X n Z (X) by I (X), i.e. the unique polynomials such that X n Z (X) =
Multiplying the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (14) by R (X), we obtain
and therefore
Let us note P i (X) R (X) U i (X) for i 2 f1; :::; N + 1g r fIg and
satis…es conditions 2 and 3.
Step 3: the non-zero eigenvalues of (5) are those of the system 
is invertible (since condition 2 is satis…ed). Therefore, according to a standard matricial result of time series analysis (cf e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chap. 10, prop. 10 .1), the eigenvalues of (L) are the roots of polynomial
1 then the eigenvalues of (L) are those of the system that is obtained by using the last N lines of (L) (given that condition 2 is satis…ed) to sequentially remove the terms in L k for k 2 f m ; :::; 0g from the …rst line of (L). This system, noted (L), is of the form P n k=0 k L k , where all k have real numbers as elements and 0 = 2 6 6 6 6 6 4
is invertible. Therefore, according to a standard matricial result of time series analysis (cf e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chap. 10, prop. 10 .1), the eigenvalues of (L) and hence those of (L) are the roots of polynomial X n X 1 , which is equal to polynomial X n X 1 . To sum up,
, the non-zero eigenvalues of (5) are the non-zero roots of polynomial X n X 1 , that is to say those of
and hence, by construction of P (L) and Q (L), those of Z (X) D (X). By de…nition of Z (X) and given assumption 3, all non-zero roots of Z (X) D (X) are of modulus strictly lower than one, so that the P (L) and Q (L) constructed at step 2 satisfy condition 4.
Step 4: (3) implies that there exists a unique R (L)
as elements, such that
where P (L) and Q (L) are the ones constructed at step 2. If m b 1 > m a 1 then multiplying both (15) and (13) 
The system made of (16) and (17) and j 0 j 6 = 0). Cramer's rule then implies that there exist (n 1 ; :::; n N +1 ) 2 N N +1 with n i d i for i 2 f1; :::; N + 1g and 1 (L)
1;k L k , where n 1 2 N and all 1;k have real numbers as elements, such that this system can be rewritten
given step 3. But Cramer's rule also implies that there exists
n 2 2 N and all 2;k have real numbers as elements, such that the targeted stationary VARMA process (3) can be rewritten
by de…nition of Z (X). Given that N +1 (X) 6 = 0 due to assumption 1.iii, the identi…cation of (18) with (19) shows that 9n 
and R (L) satisfying conditions 1 to 5 and such that (4) holds. Following proposition 1, we then conclude that (3) is the unique solution of the system made of (1) and (4).
C Proof of proposition 3
Let 2 (3) satisfying (1); and iv) is such that the system made of (1) and this rule has no non-predetermined variables and no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and . The remaining of the proof therefore deals with the case where m a 1 > m b 1 . We proceed in four steps: …rst, we show that (1) together with a backward-looking rule of type (2) can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with non-predetermined variables; second, we construct some particular F (L) and G (L) such that m f = 0, so that whatever H (L) the corresponding rule (2) is backward-looking; third, we show that whatever H (L) the system made of (1) and this rule admits at most one stationary solution and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and ; fourth, we show that a suitable choice of H (L) makes this system admit exactly one stationary solution and makes this solution coincide with the targeted stationary VARMA process (3). Note that steps 2 to 4 of this appendix largely draw on steps 2 to 4 of appendix B, with
In particular, we use in this appendix the polynomials U i (X) for i 2 f1; :::; N + 1g and (X) introduced in appendix B.
Step 1: consider a system (S) of type (1) , is equal to .
Step 2: let Z (X) 2 R [X] be a given polynomial that: i) has exactly m roots (taking into account their multiplicity) whose modulus is strictly higher than ; ii) has no root whose modulus is between 1 and ; and iii) is such that (X) is a divisor of Z (X) D (X). Let n 2 N be such that
be respectively the quotient and the remainder of the Euclidian division of X n Z (X) by N +1 (X), i.e. the unique polynomials such that
Let us note F i (X) R (X) U i (X) for i 2 f1; :::; N g and
admissible as it satis…es the requirements G (X) 2 R [X] and g 0 6 = 0. Moreover, we have 8 > < > :
Fi for i 2 f1; :::; N g , so that the F (L) constructed at step 2 is such that 8i 2 f1; :::; N g, F (X) e i 2 R [X], in other words m f = 0, i.e. any rule (2) with the F (L) and G (L) constructed at step 2 is backward-looking.
Step 3: the non-zero eigenvalues of the system made of (1) and any rule (2) with the F (L) and G (L) constructed at step 2 are those of the corresponding perfect-foresight deterministic system . . .
invertible, so that according to a standard matricial result of time series analysis (cf e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chap. 10, prop. 10 .1) this system's eigenvalues are the roots of polynomial
. As a consequence, the system's non-zero eigenvalues are the non-zero roots of
and hence, by construction of F (L) and G (L), the non-zero roots of Z (X) D (X). By de…nition of Z (X) and given assumption 3, Z (X) D (X) has no root whose modulus is between 1 and , and exactly m roots whose modulus is strictly higher than . Given step 1, this implies that the system made of (1) and any rule (2) with the F (L) and G (L) constructed at step 2 admits either one or zero stationary solution, depending on whether Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) rank condition is satis…ed or not, and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and .
Step 4: if the targeted stationary VARMA process (3) holds for t 2 Z, then: i) there exists a unique (L)
where all k have real numbers as elements, such that
where F (L) and G (L) are the ones constructed at step 2; and ii) there exists a unique
, where all i;k have real numbers as elements, such that 2
Multiplying both (20) and
. . .
The system made of (22) and (23) as elements, such that this system can be rewritten
given step 3. But Cramer's rule also implies that there exists 2 (L)
by de…nition of Z (X). Given that N +1 (X) 6 = 0 due to assumption 1.iii, the identi…cation of (24) with (25) shows that 9n 2 N, 8k > n , k = 0.
is therefore admissible. We have thus shown that, for any (3) satisfying (1), there exist F (L), G (L) and H (L) with m f = 0 such that: i) (3) implies (1) and (2); and ii) the system made of (1) and (2) admits at most one stationary solution and has non-predetermined variables and no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and . Since there exists at least one (3) satisfying (1), due to assumption 3, proposition 3 follows.
D Proof of proposition 4
Suppose m a 1 > m b 1 and consider some given n 2 N and M 2 R . Let us note S n;M the set of backward-looking rules of type (2) such that n f n, n g n, g 0 = 1, all g k for k 2 f1; :::; n g g (if n g 1) and all elements of F k for k 2 0; :::; n f have an absolute value lower than M . Whatever the rule belonging to S n;M considered, the non-zero eigenvalues of the system made of (1) and this rule are those of the corresponding perfect-foresight deterministic system iii. Assumption 1.iii and the normalization g 0 = 1 make 0 invertible, so that according to a standard matricial result of time series analysis (cf e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chap. 10, prop. 10 .1) this system's eigenvalues are the roots of polynomial
. Three results are then easily obtained: i) the coe¢ cient
is non-zero and independent of the rule belonging to S n;M considered; ii) there exists n 0 2 N such that, whatever the rule belonging to S n;M considered, the degree (N + 1) n of (X) is lower than n 0 ; iii) partly as a consequence of the second result, there exists M 0 2 R such that, whatever the rule belonging to S n;M considered, all the coe¢ cients of (X) have an absolute value lower than M 0 . These three results together imply that there exists 2 R + n [0; 1] such that, whatever the rule belonging to S n;M considered, all the roots of (X)
have an absolute value lower than and, therefore, all the eigenvalues of the system made of
(1) and this rule have a modulus lower than . However, given assumptions 1 and 2 and since
, whatever the rule belonging to S n;M considered, the system made of (1) and this rule has at least one non-predetermined variable. As a consequence, there exists no rule belonging to S n;M and such that the system made of (1) and this rule admits a unique stationary solution and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and .
E Proof of proposition 5
We proceed in three steps: …rst, we show that, with probability one, the system made of (1) and ( e R)
can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with at most non-predetermined variables;
second, we show that this system admits a unique stationary solution and has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and , with
as " ! 0.
Step 1: consider a given system (S) of type (1). 
o ; note ( e E) the resulting equation. Consider
where e A (L) is de…ned by writing ( e S) in the form for i 2 I B r f1g due to assumption 2.iii and because the only variable of type E t fz t+k g with k 2 N appearing in the system made of the rewritten system ( e S) and ( e R) is z t in ( e R). In both cases the number of non-predetermined variables is equal
Since the system made of (S) and ( e R) is equivalent to the system made of ( e S)
and ( e R), we have thus shown that, with probability one, the system made of (S) and ( e R) can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with m non-predetermined variables. Note …nally that m .
Step 2: for any system or equation (x), let (x) denote the perfect-foresight deterministic form of (x). The same reasoning as the one conducted at the beginning of appendix A, this time starting from ( e E) instead of ( ! 1 ) and using ( e R) instead of (R), leads to an equation .
Since b e A (0) is invertible, e 2;0 is invertible as well so that according to a standard matricial result of time series analysis (cf e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chap. 10, prop. 10 .1) the non-zero eigenvalues of e 2 (L), which are those of e 1 (L), are the roots of polynomial e E (X) X Now e E (X) = e E 1 (X) + e E 2 (X) where e E 1 (X) X If m = 0 then e E 1 (X) = 0. Otherwise the degree of e E 1 (X) is equal to n e 2 (N + 1) since the coe¢ cient of X n e 2 (N +1) in e E 1 (X) is e 2;0 6 = 0. For " su¢ ciently close to 0, the degree of e E 2 (X) is equal to n e 2 (N + 1) m since the coe¢ cient of X Let us note e x 1 , ..., e x n e 2 (N +1) the roots of e E (X), ranked …rst by increasing modulus (i.e. je x 1 j ::: e x n e 2 (N +1) ) and second by increasing complex argument (i.e. if 9i 2 1; :::; n e 2 (N + 1) 1 , je x i j = je x i+1 j, then ' (e x i ) ' (e x i+1 ), where ' : C ! [0; 2 [ denotes the complex argument function). Similarly, let us note x 1 , ..., x n the non-zero eigenvalues of system (5) ranked …rst by increasing modulus and second by increasing complex argument, which are all of modulus strictly lower than one since (R) satis…es condition 4. Since e E 1 (X) ! 0 as " ! 0, we have e x 1 ; :::; e x n e 2 (N +1) m ! (0; :::; 0; x 1 ; :::; x n ) as " ! 0 and 8k 2 f0; :::; m 1g , e x n e 2 (N +1) k ! +1 as " ! 0, which implies: i) that the system made of (1) and ( e R) has no eigenvalue whose modulus is between 1 and , with ! +1 as " ! 0; ii) given step 1, that this system admits either one or zero stationary solution, depending on whether Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) rank condition is satis…ed or not. Since assumption 3 and the continuous-probability-distribution assumption together ensure that this rank condition is satis…ed with probability one, we further get that this system admits one unique stationary solution.
Step 3: let us write equations ( ! k ) for k 2 f1; :::; N g, obtained in appendix A, in the form
where n ! u ; n ! v ; n U (0) , so that since U (0) = is invertible, ! U (0) is invertible as well. In this case, the same reasoning as the one conducted at the end of appendix A, this time using
and W (L), leads to a system of the form
with 1 (L) (N +1) (N +1)
where n 1 ; n 2 2 N 2 , all 1;k , 2;k have real numbers as elements, 1;0 is invertible and all eigenvalues of 1 (L) are of modulus strictly lower than one. Since (26) is equivalent to the system made of (S) and (R), (10) is the unique solution of (26).
Similarly, let us follow the same reasoning as the one conducted at the beginning of appendix A, this time starting from ( e E) instead of ( ! 1 ) and using ( e R) instead of (R), to get equations ( f ! 2 ) to ( f ! N ) corresponding to equations ( ! 2 ) to ( ! N ) in appendix A. Equations ( e E) and ( f ! k ) for k 2 f2; :::; N g can then be re-written in the form
with e X k ! X k ) implies in turn the "absolutely continuous" convergence d( e X (L) ; X (L)) ! 0 along the sequence of e X (L) considered.
